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Several recent theories postulate why some countries were able to devise institutions conducive
to long-run economic growth whereas others were not. Most of these consider various
historical factors or geographic characteristics as important predeterminants. But which of
these theories comes closest to the truth? This paper simultaneously considers several
competing theories and empirically examines which ones provide the strongest explanations
for contemporary institutions. I find that settler mortality rates are strongly associated with
contemporary institutions even when controlling for other important historical factors,
including ones from theories that do not emphasize geographic characteristics. However,
Englebert’s concept of state legitimacy does best at explaining institutional outcomes within
sub-Saharan Africa. 
JEL classification codes: O11, O17
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I. Introduction
According to Parente and Prescott (2000), average income levels between the highest
and lowest income countries differ by a factor of 30. What accounts for these
differences? Cannot lagging countries simply emulate more advanced countries
and so catch-up over time? Many have cited distinctions in institutions to explain
these differences. As argued in North (1981, 1990), economic outcomes are a function
of the incentives that institutional arrangements provide to individuals. Institutions
that create incentives to produce output and engage in innovative activity will spur
economic growth whereas institutions that encourage rent seeking will thwart
economic prosperity. 
* Dr. Kevin Sylwester, Dept. of Economics, MC 4515, Southern Illinois University, Carbondale, IL
62901; phone: 618-453-5347, fax: 618-453-2717, ksylwest@siu.edu. I would like to thank two anonymous
referees for their helpful comments.Knack and Keefer (1995) report that institutions promoting bureaucratic efficiency,
enforcement of contracts, protection of property, and limits to government
expropriation are positively associated with the growth of income per capita in a
cross-section of countries. Mauro (1995) finds negative correlations between
corruption and economic growth and between bureaucratic inefficiency and growth.
Parente and Prescott (2000) argue that institutional barriers to technology adoption
largely explain income disparities across countries. Bertocchi and Canova (2002)
report that former British and French African colonies grew faster than Portuguese,
Belgian, and Italian ones. One possible explanation is that French and British
colonies were able to establish more effective colonial institutions that could be
used as a foundation for economic growth after independence.
But these hypotheses and findings immediately beg the question as to why some
countries were able to develop effective institutions while others were not as fortunate.
One possible explanation is that institutions cannot be substantially modified in
short periods of time and so today’s institutions depend greatly on their historical
antecedents. Hall and Jones (1999) and Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson (2001)
point to how geographic factors influenced the extent of European settlement or
influence. Englebert (2000a, 2000b), on the other hand, focuses on the evolution
of the state. Countries where the state did not arise endogenously but was imposed
from external sources are viewed to be less able to create institutions or promote
policies that spur economic growth. Bockstette, Chanda, and Putterman (2002)
consider the past extent of state level institutions as important for the existence of
strong modern-day institutions. Countries having state institutions with longer
historical antecedents are predicted to have better institutions today. However,
Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson (2002) consider a “reversal” where (outside
Europe) populous, rich regions circa 1500 have weaker institutions and are poorer
today. 
This paper analyzes these various hypotheses as to why some countries were
able to form salutary institutions whereas others did not. In this sense, this paper is
similar to Easterly and Levine (2003). They consider several hypotheses regarding
historical or geographic explanations for the distinctions between rich and poor
countries today. They find little evidence that geographic factors explain income
levels today other than through institutions. However, the institutional theories they
consider all have geographic foundations. For example, Acemoglu et al. (2001)
argue that climate determined settler mortality which then influenced institutional
outcomes. Or, Engerman and Sokoloff (1997) see factor endowments as influencing
subsequent institutions. I pursue a different track. I do not consider direct effects
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institutions promoting economic growth. But unlike Easterly and Levine (2003), I
also consider theories of institutional formation that are not grounded in geography
such as those from Englebert (2000) and Bockstette et al. (2002). Is the reason some
countries developed institutions conducive to economic prosperity primarily due
to geographic differences across world regions or do other factors matter? 
The empirical work will utilize both a world sample and an African sample.
Although most of sub-Saharan Africa has not enjoyed rapid economic growth,
exceptions arise and I deem it important to understand why these few have been
more successful. Bloom and Sachs (1998) and Easterly and Levine (1997) join
Englebert in citing Africa’s problems as motivation for their work.1
The paper is organized as follows. Section II provides further discussion on
recent work in this area and presents in greater detail the hypotheses mentioned
above. Section III discusses the empirical specification. Section IV presents the
results. A conclusion follows. Details regarding data and their sources are provided
in an appendix. 
II. Background
Hall and Jones (1999) examine to what extent institutions matter for economic
development. They regress the natural log of output per worker on a measure of
social infrastructure which is viewed as the government’s commitment to both
promoting nondistortionary policies (e.g., support for free trade) and protecting
property rights. Since social infrastructure is likely to be endogenous, they use
various measures of western European influence as instruments, such as the fraction
of the population that speak a western European language. They also consider
latitude since Europeans were more likely to settle in temperate climates. Their
premise is that beneficial institutions evolved in regions with strong connections
to Europe. 
Acemoglu et al. (2001) examine European influence in more depth than do Hall
and Jones (1999). They argue that western influence can be beneficial to the long-
run development of a colony but can sometimes be quite malignant, King Leopold’s
Belgian Congo being an apposite example. (Hochschild 1998 and Pakenham 1991
present further details as to colonialism in the Belgian Congo. Alam 1994 discusses
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1 Savvides (1995) and Ghura and Hadjimichael (1995) present general treatments of economic growth
in Africa as well as provide surveys of previous work.more generally the costs and benefits of colonialism for the indigenous population.)
It is difficult to imagine that such pernicious forms of influence would have beneficial
long-run effects upon postcolonial development. Moreover, the institutional structure
created in these colonies need not be similar to that enjoyed by denizens at home.
They further argue that whether European influence was malignant or beneficial
depended on the degree of European settlement. Colonies that attracted a large
number of colonists were less likely to be extractive since this community of settlers
would not want to see wealth leaving the colony. Moreover, they were likely to
erect similar institutions as found in the home country. Finally, areas with low
mortality rates for settlers would be areas more likely for settlement. Hence, mortality
rates among settlers influenced the number of settlers which influenced what type
of colonial institutions developed. With institutional inertia over time, postcolonial
institutions remained similar to colonial ones, thereby linking colonial institutions
to present day income levels. They conclude that these institutions explain in large
part income differences (at least among former colonies) and these same institutions
can be traced back to colonial settlement.2
A slightly different view comes from Engerman and Sokoloff (1997) who argue
that present day income differences between North America and Latin America
stem from geographic differences that led to large plantations in the latter but smaller
farms in North America. Such geographic differences include what types of crops
could best be grown since the type of crop greatly influenced the prevalence of
plantations versus small farming. Because of these differences, Latin America had
greater income inequality which affected subsequent institutions and development.3
These above theories are the ones Easterly and Levine (2003) examine. However,
other theories of institutional formation need not rely upon geographic underpinnings.
Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson (2002) argue that regions with higher population
density were more likely to become extractive colonies since a large population
could be exploited through forced labor or onerous taxation. Consequently, regions
with high income and high population before European colonization, possibly but
not necessarily due to geography, developed extractive institutions and lower relative
income over time. 
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2 However, Glaeser et al. (2004) postulate that it was the infusion of human capital and not subsequent
institutional development as to why these regions of low settler mortality became relatively rich. 
3 Engerman and Sokoloff (1997) also cite Spanish migration restrictions as an important determinants
for many of Latin America’s political and economic problems since a relatively few number of Spaniards
ruled over large indigenous populations.Englebert (2000a, 2000b) argues that countries differ nontrivially as to how the
modern state arose and, specifically, whether precolonial and postcolonial institutions
coincide. Englebert considers a state legitimate if the creation of that country was
not brought about by external forces where large groups of indigenous inhabitants
view incongruities between the resulting state and earlier ones. In many cases,
countries with illegitimate states are ones with borders created by external forces
such as European governments partitioning Africa in the late 1800’s. Often, although
not always, these borders resulted in groups without any previous history of shared
governance or political structures falling into the same country. This results in a
political structure that is new or at least with little historical foundation.4,5 More
formally, Englebert defines a state to be legitimate if the country was never colonized
in the era of the nation-state; or, if the country was colonized: no indigenous peoples
existed prior to European colonization, or the country was colonized but settlers
substantially marginalized indigenous peoples, or the country recovered its previous
sovereignty or identity at independence, or the postcolonial state does not do severe
violence to pre-existing political institutions.
Examples of legitimate states include those countries that were never colonized
since the era of the nation state (1500 AD) so that their institutions have evolved
internally over time. That is, the state was never directly imposed from above by
external actors. This does not mean that the state or its institutions remained constant
over time or that national borders remained fixed but that these changes did not
occur by external forces creating countries lacking historical antecedents. Many
countries of Europe fall into this category. 
Legitimate states also include former colonies where the colonists substantially
displaced the indigenous population, such as in the United States or Australia. Since
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4 In the case where a military leader deposes a democratic regime or more generally with any type of
extra-constitutional transfer of power, the resulting leader or government is often described as “illegitimate”.
This is not the context in which the terms “legitimate” and “illegitimate” are used here. Instead of
referring to a political government or leadership within a country’s history, “legitimacy” refers to the
creation of the nation itself. This is not to say that illegal transfers of power are unimportant or that
undemocratic or unpopular governments do not face political constraints that might inhibit them from
promoting growth enhancing policies but only that the paper considers a different concept of legitimacy.  
5 Since the focus is upon whether or not the state at independence is incongruent with precolonial
institutions, the classification of a state as legitimate or illegitimate does not change over time. If
previously separate groups in a country see themselves increasingly over time belonging to the same
community or become more comfortable with the prevailing institutions, then the status at independence
becomes less relevant for the current institutional structure.the indigenous population was completely marginalized, the inhabitants of the new
nation did not view a conflict between postcolonial and precolonial institutions. To
some extent, then, this theory is not completely disjoint from that in Acemoglu et
al. (2001) since both see large influxes of European settlers as beneficial for long-
run institutions. However, whereas they focus on the absolute number of settlers,
Englebert focuses on the relative number. Thus, Englebert classifies South Africa
as illegitimate because European settlers, though numerous, remained a minority.
Similar examples of legitimate states also include trivial cases like Cape Verde
which did not contain people before colonization. 
A state can also be legitimate if it recovers the sovereignty it held before
colonization such as in the cases of Egypt or Tunisia. The colonial period does not
undo a shared sense of identity of the majority of the populace and so they do not
view governing structures arising after independence as foreign. Instead, the colonial
period is merely an interruption of a longer shared history. Although to a lesser
degree, legitimate states can also arise when postcolonial governance arises from
a source familiar to precolonial times even if the country was not in existence before
colonization. One example is Botswana where the Tswana kingdoms predated
colonialism but survived it so that Botswana’s first president, Sereste Khama, came
directly out of this system as the former heir to the Ngwato kingship. Englebert
also sees countries like Singapore falling into this category. Singapore seceded from
Malaysia in 1965 as its population on its own volition formed a new country and
no large group within Singapore opposed its creation. Thus, no conflict arose, at
least as perceived by the denizens of Singapore, between Singapore’s political
institutions and what had preceded them. 
If states do not fall into one of these categories, they are labeled illegitimate
because the contemporary state apparatus lacks historical antecedents predating
colonization. Africa contains numerous examples. Various groups without precolonial
political linkages suddenly found themselves in a single political unit but these were
not unions of their own choosing. Instead, these unions were created via European
fiat. Thus, leaders arising after independence did not come from traditional sources
or were, themselves, seen as “foreign” to sizable groups within the country. Davidson
(1992) also argues that political problems involving nascent states at independence
have greatly contributed to Africa’s poor outcomes. 
Englebert argues that governing regimes of legitimate states are not as constrained
as those in illegitimate ones by the need to satisfy various constituencies to remain
in power. Instead, they have a stronger historical foundation which creates a firmer
power base. Thus, these governments can take more long-term perspectives and
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politically important constituencies. Leaders of countries with illegitimate states
have had to sacrifice economic development in order to gain political support. In
this sense, effective policies promoting growth and development do not arise from
western influence per se but from a congruent institutional link with the past.
Englebert forms a dummy variable from this legitimate—illegitimate dichotomy
and shows that legitimate states have better institutional and economic outcomes.
Bockstette et al. (2002) also consider non-geographic explanations for institutional
development. They argue that countries having longer histories of statehood are
more likely to develop institutions conducive to economic growth. Reasons for such
benefits could stem from learning-by-doing effects, improved social cohesion over
time, and the promotion of attitudes respecting political authority and hierarchy.
They develop a measure of state antiquity where higher values denote the greater
prevalence of a state structure in the past. They then show that this measure is
correlated with economic growth from 1960 to 1995 in a Barro-type growth regression.
Although they also focus upon historical antecedents of the modern state, this view
differs from Englebert’s in that Englebert does not view legitimacy as necessarily
a function of time or duration. However a common element of these two theories
and an advantage over the geographic-based ones is that they are not limited to
where Europeans chose to settle but can explain why European countries, themselves,
generally developed institutions favorable to economic prosperity. 
III. Empirical specification
Details regarding the variables used below are provided in the appendix. Consider
the following empirical model: 
INSTITUTION = a + b*H + c*G + d*X + e. (1)
INSTITUTION denotes the institutional measure employed and is explained
below. Matrix H considers the historical factors outlined above hypothesized to
determine current institutions. Matrix G denotes geographic factors and matrix X
consists of other control variables. The particular elements in G and X will depend
on the theory being considered and are also described below. For example, when
considering the importance of settler mortality on contemporary institutions,
geographic controls such as latitude are used to better ensure that the coefficient
on settler mortality does not capture direct effects of geography on institutional
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necessarily identical variance across observations. Consequently, White’s
heteroskedastic-consistent covariance matrices are used. 
Equation (1) assumes that income or other measures of development such as
human capital is not a determinant of institutional quality although this is certainly
controversial. If beneficial institutions are costly in that they require resources, then
higher income countries can better afford them. This includes the possibility that
effective institutions can only arise with a sufficiently educated populace since
higher income countries can devote more resources to education. On the other hand,
it is not clear whether income levels do, indeed, cause institutions. Acemoglu et al.
(2001) find that causation from income to institutions is less important than is
measurement error when comparing 2SLS to LS results. Moreover, political structures
and constitutional protections have evolved in the U.S. since 1787 but their foundation
remains the same, the U.S. Constitution. Since average income was much lower in
1787, perhaps it is not low income that restricts communities from creating institutions,
including political structures, conducive to economic growth. However, it is difficult
to test the above conjectures. Inserting lagged income into the right hand side of
(1) would not solve the problem of reverse causation if both income and institutions
are persistent over time. Finding factors to instrument for income is also difficult.6
A drawback of omitting income in (1) is that variables in H, G, or X could
determine income which then determines institutions. As in Glaeser et al. (2004),
perhaps settler mortality influenced the extent of European settlement. The main
benefit, they argue, of large inflows of Europeans was not better institutions but
more human capital and higher income which then produced better institutions. By
not controlling for income, these possibilities cannot be quickly dismissed.
Nevertheless, since all the theories I compare view institutions as determining
income, omitting income coincides with the arguments of the theoretical models
presented in Section II. 
I use three measures of institutions. The first (INST) is the measure used by
Easterly and Levine (2003) from Kaufmann et al. (1999) which averages six separate
measures of institutions: voice and accountability, political stability, government
effectiveness, regulatory quality, rule of law, and absence of corruption. To diminish
the potential for one year aberrations to drive results, I also average data intertemporally
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6 Some studies have used geographic characteristics to instrument for income. However, such a procedure
is unwarranted here since geographic factors are argued in some of these theories to be determinants of
institutions. from the years 1996, 1998, 2000, 2002, and 2004. A second measure is GOV from
Englebert. GOV is the first principal component of a set of institutional measures:
the Gastil measure of civil liberties from Freedom House, a measure of what
percentage of the population speaks the official language, and five measures of
institutions from Inter-Country Risk Guide. These five measures are: the absence
of corruption, bureaucratic quality, government commitment not to modify contracts
with foreign firms, adherence to the rule of law, and the lack of risk of government
expropriation of property.7 Finally, I also consider GADP, an index measuring
government antidiversion policies, from Hall and Jones (1999).8 Instead of using
a principal component, GADP is the sum of five more specific institutional measures:
a measure of the rule of law, a measure of the government’s commitment to honor
contracts with foreign firms, a measure of the government’s refraining from
expropriating foreign property, a measure of corruption, and a measure of bureaucratic
quality. See the appendix for further details. All of these measures are broad in that
they consider several aspects of institutions and so provide a more encompassing
definition than looking solely at corruption or protection of property. In all three
measures, higher values denote institutions that are, presumably, more effective at
promoting economic growth. In presenting results, I focus on INST for two reasons.
One, INST is more recent as it is taken from the late 1990’s and early 2000’s. GOV
and GADP are both created using data from the mid 1980’s to the mid 1990’s.
Second, INST is available for more countries, 116 in the baseline specification
found in the first column of Table 2. For this same specification, GOV is available
for only 82 countries and GADP for 91. 
The variables in H include (although not considered all at once): Englebert’s
measure of state legitimacy (LEGIT), the natural logarithm of settler mortality
(MORT) from Acemoglu et al. (2001), the measure of state history (STANQ) from
Bockstette et al. (2002), a good crops index (CROP) constructed similarly to that
in Easterly and Levine (2003) to capture the potential for the raising of crops
conducive to beneficial institutions, and the population density (DEN) in 1500. The
latter two measures capture initial factor endowments argued by Engerman and
Sokoloff (1997) to be important for subsequent institutional development. DEN is
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7 Putnam (1993) also constructs an index of regional institutions in Italy also using principal components.
Alesina and Perotti (1995) create an aggregate measure of political instability by using the first principal
component of a set of instability measures. 
8 The correlation between INST and GADP is 0.78. That between INST and GOV is 0.81 and the
correlation between GADP and GOV is 0.97.also of central focus in the theory of Acemoglu et al. (2002) since large indigenous
populations were likely to be exploited by colonizers. 
Matrix G always contains AFRICA which takes the value one for a country in
sub-Saharan Africa and zero otherwise. I include AFRICA for four reasons. One,
there could be conditions endemic to traditional African societies that make it more
difficult to erect beneficial institutions. Two, an insignificant coefficient on the
African dummy would suggest that the other independent variables are, at least to
some extent, able to explain why African nations score poorly on institutional
measures. On the other hand, a significant coefficient on AFRICA suggests that the
other variables cannot fully explain Africa’s difficulties in establishing effective
institutions and so other explanations need to be considered. A third reason is that
because of Africa’s poor economic performance, there may be a bias to grade African
institutions more harshly than those from other regions. Finally, since most African
countries are labeled as illegitimate, not including an African dummy would skew
the findings in favor of the relevance of state legitimacy. I also include an East
Asian dummy to control for those countries experiencing the “East Asian Economic
Miracle” (Japan, Singapore, South Korea, and Taiwan).
Inclusion of other variables in G including latitude (LAT) and whether or not a
country is landlocked (LNDLOCK) will depend upon which theory is under
examination. They are included to help ensure that particular measures are not
merely capturing direct effects of geography on institutional outcomes. If these
variables only matter through the extent of European settlement or agricultural
composition, then they should not be associated with institutional outcomes once
MORT or CROP is included in the model. 
Initially, matrix X contains more traditional variables related to colonization.
INDEP [=ln(1995 −year of independence)] is included to account for the possibility
that institutional quality is a function of time since independence. Institutions might
strengthen over time as political issues arising at independence become resolved.9
Four colonial dummies are also included: BRUSSELS, LISBON, MADRID, and
PARIS. The control group of countries consists of former British colonies as well
as the few observations that were never colonized.10Perhaps institutional outcomes
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9 However, Olson (1982) argues that institutions more greatly promote rent seeking over time as they
become influenced or captured by various groups in society. If true, then it is not clear that the coefficient
on INDEP should be positive.
10 Adding a LONDON dummy taking the value one for former British colonies does not change the
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Summary Statistics
Non-Dummy Variables Dummy Variables
Variable Mean Median Std. Dev. Variable Mean
INST -0.233 -0.278 0.770 LEGIT 0.581
-0.645 -0.681 0.609 0.200
GADP 0.536 0.540 0.158 LNDLOCK 0.168
0.476 0.476 0.122 0.304
GOV -0.756 -1.186 1.751 BRUSSELS 0.025
-1.641 -1.554 1.237 0.065
LAT 0.196 0.169 0.122 LISBON 0.050
0.128 0.129 0.083 0.087
INDEP 3.963 3.555 0.999 MADRID 0.160
3.513 3.555 0.773 0.000
ELF 0.464 0.520 0.292 PARIS 0.202
0.651 0.715 0.247 0.391
MORT 4.699 4.401 1.216 AFRICA 0.387
5.669 5.635 1.151 1.000
CROP 0.021 -0.001 0.119 EASIA 0.034
0.045 0.016 0.104 0.000
DEN 1.133 0.928 0.848
1.068 0.914 0.767
STANQ 0.345 0.260 0.220
0.230 0.210 0.129
POP 15.294 15.452 1.958
15.051 15.391 1.451
EUR 0.267 0.000 0.404
0.057 0.000 0.184
Correlations
LEGIT MORT DEN STANQ CROP
INST 0.376 -0.582 -0.441 -0.141 0.231
LEGIT -0.519 -0.045 0.062 0.023
MORT 0.260 -0.228 -0.048
DEN 0.399 -0.063
STANQ -0.015
Notes: Top entry of each cell of top panel denotes value for full sample. The second entry denotes value for sub-Saharan African
sample. Due to missing data, the samples for each series are not identical.
Table 1. Descriptive Statisticsdepend on the identity of the colonizer since, for example, English settlements might
have had held advantages over Spanish ones in regards to long-run institutional
formation.11 Other control variables are described in the next section. 
The sample size consists of non-European countries. I omit Europe since some
of the above theories do not pertain to European cases. Descriptive statistics are
presented in Table 1. Not surprisingly, sub-Saharan African countries score less
well both in regards to institutions and to those factors deemed important for
institutions. The correlation between STANQ and DEN is high at 0.4. This is also
not surprising since large populous regions centuries ago could be considered as
nascent states. Note, however, that theories differ as to whether these early
conglomerations benefited or retarded formation of institutions conducive to long-
run growth. Moreover, the latter is more strongly correlated with INST. In fact, the
unconditional correlation between STANQ and INST is negative. A high correlation
also appears between MORT and LEGIT, possibly because one way for a state to
be classified as legitimate is for settlers to marginalize indigenous populations. 
IV. Determinants of institutions
Table 2 presents results when testing each of the five theories individually. The first
column presents coefficient estimates for only the controls. The coefficient on
AFRICA is strongly negative and highly significant as is that for BRUSSELS. The
coefficient on EASIA is positive and also statistically significant. The second column
considers LEGIT. An index of ethnolinguistic fractionalization (ELF) is included
as an additional control since countries with heterogeneous populations could have
been formed by Europeans externally combining disparate groups and so one does
not want the coefficient on LEGIT to merely capture such heterogeneity. Column
3 considers STANQ. Column 4 considers the natural logarithm of population density
in 1500, DEN. Since population density in 1500 is correlated with population size
today, I control for the latter so as to focus on population sizes centuries ago and
not contemporary ones. Let POP denote the natural logarithm of the country’s
population. Column 5 considers the good crops index, CROP. I control for geographic
Journal of Applied Economics 384
11 See Grier (1999) and Bertocchi and Canova (2002) for examinations of how growth outcomes depend
on the identity of the colonizer. For examples of how colonial policies differed across European countries,
see Low (1988) who describes how Britain took greater steps prior to 1960 to prepare their African
colonies for independence than did other colonizers. Moreover, Conquery-Vidrovitch (1988) describes
how former French colonies retained stronger ties to France after independence than did former non-
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Table 2. Baseline regressions with INST aNos dependent variable
Column 1 2 3 4 5 6
Constant 0.2787 -0.3963 0.1472 1.0655** -0.4965* 1.6758*
(0.2030) (0.4001) (0.2690) (0.4287) (0.2988) (0.8762)
AFRICA -0.5132*** -0.1296 -0.6456*** -0.5534*** -0.2311 0.2940
(0.1557) (0.1969) (0.2262) (0.1645) (0.1791) (0.2346)
EASIA 1.0712*** 1.0648*** 1.1521*** 1.4986*** 0.6540* 1.4533***
(0.2597) (0.2736) (0.2250) (0.2039) (0.3539) (0.2631)
BRUSSELS -0.9653*** -1.1859*** -0.9816*** -0.4462 -0.6267** -1.1116**
(0.2767) (0.1993) (0.2521) (0.4793) (0.2802) (0.4301)
LISBON -0.0386 -0.2317 -0.3059 -0.3560 -0.0827 -0.6670
(0.2723) (0.3165) (0.3488) (0.2248) (0.2751) (0.4463)
MADRID -0.0819 0.1054 -0.6560** -0.3321 0.1436 -0.0417
(0.1896) (0.2044) (0.2557) (0.2085) (0.1835) (0.2791)
PARIS -0.2898* -0.0995 -0.3707* -0.2494 -0.1943 -0.4131**
(0.1534) (0.1721) (0.2023) (0.1694) (0.1589) (0.2030)
INDEP -0.0664 -0.0967 0.1716 0.0615 -0.0312 -0.1483



















R2 0.2967 0.3849 0.4574 0.4108 0.3175 0.5695
# of obser. 117 95 85 105 102 65
Robustness checks
CANZUS 0.6046*** -0.7392 -0.0936 0.0969 -0.2032**
DEP VAR? Robust Robust Robust Robust Robust
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. * Significant at 10%, ** 5%, and *** 1% level. CANZUS: the counterpart to the above
underlined coefficient when Canada, Australia, New Zealand, and the United States are not included in the specification. DEP
VAR?: Are results regarding historical characteristic under consideration robust to using GOV or GADP as the dependent variable?location by including LAT in the specification. Finally, column 6 considers settler
mortality. Since Europeans were more likely to settle in temperate climates near
the sea, I include LNDLOCK and LAT as controls. I also include ELF since areas
of large European settlement might also now be countries having distinct ethnic
backgrounds within the population.
The top panel of Table 2 presents the baseline results. The bottom panel summarizes
various robustness checks. CANZUS denotes the four “New Europes” of Canada,
Australia, New Zealand and the United States. Thus, the CANZUS row in Table 2
presents the coefficient estimate of the counterpart to the above underlined coefficient
when the CANZUS countries are removed. The “DEP VAR?” row summarizes if
results are robust to replacing INST with GOV or GADP. 
Of the results presented here, the strongest findings are for MORT and LEGIT.
The coefficients on MORT and LEGIT are significant regardless of the inclusion
of the CANZUS countries and regardless of which dependent variable is used. The
coefficient on DEN is significant but only with the inclusion of CANZUS. The
coefficient for CROP is not significant. No evidence arises that the amount of land
suitable for particular crops is associated with the institutional outcomes of today.12
A possible explanation is that Engermann and Sokolof (1997) focus on Latin America
and perhaps their arguments are less relevant for a wider sample of countries. Finally,
evidence regarding state history is very weak. The coefficient is actually negative
although it loses significance when the CANZUS countries are removed. A negative
coefficient suggests that state history is negatively associated with institutional
quality. Of course, another explanation is not that the importance on state antiquity
is misplaced but that STANQ does a poor job of measuring this concept. For example,
recent English settlers of Canada and the U.S. might have felt themselves to be part
of a longstanding political lineage predating their independence.13
Easterly and Levine (2003) consider many of the same “geographic” based
theories of institutional formation as the ones considered here. They find support
for the importance of settler mortality as well as the land’s suitability for crops
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12 CROP is constructed using crop suitability given intermediate levels of input. Results are robust to
using high input usage estimates of crop suitability. Results are also robust to replacing CROP by the
WHEAT and SUGAR dummies used in Eastery and Levine (2003) where a dummy equals one if the
country grew any level of the commodity and zero otherwise. In fact, the coefficient on WHEAT was
negative as was the coefficient on SUGAR. 
13 Column 3 retains INDEP in the specification because INDEP and STANQ are not the same since
some countries could have state histories (as viewed by Bockstette et al. 2002) predating modern
independence. However, results remain robust when INDEP is removed from the specification.conducive to a plantation system of farming. Of the two, this paper finds only the
former to be strongly associated with institutions. Of the two theories not based on
geography, only state legitimacy is positively associated with institutions. The
coefficient on LAT is also highly significant. One possible explanation is that
geography has important effects on institutions aside from those outlined above
and so is deserving of future study. However, another explanation is that MORT
does a poor job of measuring true settler mortality which is, instead, somewhat
captured by variables like LAT.
Table 3 examines theories concurrently and attempts to better distinguish among
them. In the first three columns, the coefficient on LEGIT generally remains positive
and significant although its coefficient estimate is not statistically significant in
column one when GOV or GADP are employed as dependent variables. The
coefficient on DEN is significant but, as above, not when the CANZUS countries
are removed from the sample. The coefficient on CROP is now positive and significant,
but that result weakens when other measures of institutions are used. 
Column 4 examines state legitimacy with settler mortality. As stated in the
previous section, the two are not entirely distinct as countries with many European
settlers are classified as legitimate since these settlers displaced indigenous people.
However, does this aspect of state legitimacy solely explain the positive coefficient
on LEGIT or do the other components in the classification of legitimate states also
matter? When the two are included together, only the coefficient on MORT remains
statistically significant. (However, LEGIT is significant for these 65 countries when
MORT is not included and so the insignificance of LEGIT comes from the inclusion
of MORT and not the reduction in sample size.)14Finally, column 5 replaces MORT
with the fraction of the population speaking a western European language (EUR)
from Hall and Jones (1999). Data for EUR is more available than that for MORT.
Moreover, EUR should take on high values where Europeans settled. Again, the
coefficient on LEGIT is not statistically significant and is far lower than its counterpart
in Table 2. 
Therefore, results are strongest for MORT. Although some support for LEGIT
appears in Table 2 and in some specifications in Table 3, it appears that this support
could come from cases where countries developed legitimate states because settlers
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14 When LEGIT is replaced with LEGITR, where LEGITR denotes the residuals from a logistic regression
of LEGIT on a constant and MORT, the same findings arise. The coefficient on MORT in the logistic
regression is -1.4, significant at the 0.1% level. LEGITR denotes the component of the legitimacy index
not predicted by settler mortality rates.Journal of Applied Economics 388
Table 3. Comparison regressions with INST as dependent variable
Column 1 2 3 4 5
Constant -0.0009 0.1572 -0.6891 1.4155 -0.9762**
(0.3610) (0.8773) (0.4402) (0.9632) (0.4076)
AFRICA -0.4737* -0.2682 0.0045 0.3190 0.0680
(0.2460) (0.2197) (0.2019) (0.2235) (0.2107)
EASIA 1.0655*** 1.4659*** 1.1104*** 1.3672*** 1.4715***
(0.2560) (0.2872) (0.3416) (0.2734) (0.3299)
BRUSSELS -1.2271*** -0.7061 -0.9747*** -1.1657** -0.7211**
(0.2870) (0.4289) (0.2377) (0.4206) (0.2947)
LISBON -0.5487* -0.3758 -0.2239 -0.6221 -0.4843*
(0.3008) (0.3196) (0.3292) (0.4680) (0.2580)
MADRID -0.5438** -0.1659 0.2708 0.0302 -0.3572
(0.2653) (0.2428) (0.1976) (0.2827) (0.2264)
PARIS -0.2869 -0.1288 -0.1128 -0.3451* -0.0394
(0.1948) (0.1896) (0.1663) (0.1874) (0.1527)
INDEP 0.0961 -0.0280 -0.1246* -0.1788 -0.0787
(0.1036) (0.0942) (0.0630) (0.1431) (0.0632)






ELF 0.1478 0.2659 0.4397 -0.2496 0.4192
(0.3034) (0.3940) (0.3812) (0.4726) (0.3248)
LEGIT 0.4398** 0.6347*** 0.7106*** 0.2831 0.3192











R2 0.5174 0.4526 0.4200 0.5791 0.5821
# of obser. 81 91 95 65 95
Robustness checks
CANZUS 0.3693** 0.5214** 0.4328*** 0.2644 0.3855
-0.4175 -0.0781 0.7738** -0.1845* 0.8079***




Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. * Significant at 10%, ** 5%, and *** 1% level. CANZUS: the counterpart to the above
underlined coefficient (in the order given above) when Canada, Australia, New Zealand, and the United States are not included in
the specification. DEP VAR?: Are results regarding historical characteristic robust to using GOV or GADP as the dependent variable?displaced indigenous peoples and so stems from reasons similar to those argued in
Acemoglu et al. (2001). However, might similar findings hold for a particular region? 
Table 4 considers only a sub-Saharan African sample for two reasons. One,
Africa’s generally poor economic performance warrants enhanced attention. Second,
coefficient estimates could differ across world regions and so examining regions
separately can provide greater insight as to what extent theories are applicable to
specific regions.15 Unfortunately, most regions have far fewer observations than
does Africa and so a similar separate analysis cannot be done for all regions.
MADRID is removed since only one country in sub-Saharan Africa was colonized
by Spain (Equatorial Guinea) and data for this country is not available. The coefficient
on LEGIT in column 1 increases in magnitude from its counterpart in Table 2. Some
evidence arises that crop type is associated with modern institutions but this finding
is not robust to using other institutional measures. Unlike the findings of Easterly
and Levine (1997) no evidence arises that more ethnically diverse countries in
Africa had worse institutional outcomes. 
The coefficient on MORT is not significant using two of the three institutional
variables. Less evidence arises that settler mortality is an important determinant of
institutions within Africa relative to using a global sample. The coefficient on EUR
is also not positive and significant within this subsample. In fact, it becomes negative
when GOV replaces INST as the dependent variable in column 7.16 Now, support
for state legitimacy outweighs that for settler mortality in regards to their importance
for long-run institutional outcomes. Thus, results within Africa provide more support
for Englebert’s theory of the importance of state legitimacy. Settler mortality is less
able to explain differences within Africa.17
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15 See Block (2001) for an examination of to what extent coefficient estimates differ across world regions.
16 However, the respective coefficients on EUR do not change when the sample is restricted to use of only
observations where MORT is available. Hence, it is not use of different samples that create different findings
when EUR replaces MORT. Instead, more substantive explanations are possible. Perhaps EUR is also
picking up human capital which Glaeser et al. (2004) argue is important for institutions. Or, perhaps one
of these measures does a better job of capturing the key historical attributes important for institutions today. 
17 Despite the concerns outlined in Section III of using lagged income as a right hand side variable, I
reran the above specifications inserting the natural logarithm of GDP per capita in 1960 as a right hand
side variable. The coefficient on income was positive and generally significant throughout the specifications
of Tables 2 and 3. The only change to the above findings was that the coefficient on MORT was no
longer significant although the coefficient for EUR was significant when it was used as a substitute for
MORT so as to increase sample size. The findings in Table 4 for the sub-Saharan African sample did
not change. Moreover, the coefficient on lagged income was positive but not significant for this subset
























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































This paper has attempted to link institutions to various historical underpinnings.
The importance of settler mortality in influencing long-run institutions is supported.
However, far less support appears for the other theories based on geography. Although
they could be more relevant for specific areas such as New World colonies, they
do not appear to be generally associated with modern day institutions. Some support
also arises for Englebert’s concept of state legitimacy. It is often positively and
significantly associated with later institutional development. However, this association
could arise because one way to create a legitimate state is for settlers to displace
aborigines. Once controlling for settler mortality and so, implicitly, for the extent
of settlement, the association between state legitimacy and subsequent institutions
greatly weakens in a global sample of countries. Nevertheless, state legitimacy still
appears to be a somewhat strong candidate in explaining differences within sub-
Saharan Africa and better than the other theories considered here. 
In some sense, these or any findings relating institutional outcomes to historical
characteristics are pessimistic in that a country cannot undo its past or change its
geography (short of conquering territory). Nevertheless, it is hoped that a better
understanding of why some countries have been less able to form effective institutions
will provide policy makers with increased insight as to how to overcome these
obstacles.
Appendix. Sources and definitions of variables 
[Englebert]: Englebert (2000a), http://www.politics.pomona.edu/penglebert/
[HJ]: Hall and Jones (1999), http://emlab.berkeley.edu/users/chad/HallJones400.asc
COMM: equals 1 if any of the commodity is grown in the country and zero otherwise.
For example, WHEAT = 1 if a country produces any amount of wheat and zero
otherwise. Data is for 1999 and derived from the Food and Agriculture Organization
(FAO). 
CROP: equals log[(1 + zmaize + zwheat)/(1 + zrice + zsugarcane) where zX is the
share of the land that can growth crop X as judged by the FAO. To construct CROP,
I use land classified as suitable or very suitable under intermediate input use. Data
can be found at: http://www.fao.org/ag/agl/agll/gaez/index.htm.
Journal of Applied Economics 392DEN: Population in 1500 divided by area. In some cases, only regional data is given
such as for Central America. In this case, the same value of regional population
divided by regional area is used for all countries within the region. [McEvedy and
Jones 1978].
ELF: measure of ethnolinguistic fractionalization that denotes the probability that
two randomly selected people are not from the same ethnolinguistic group, based
on 1963 Soviet Atlas Norodov Mirna [Englebert].
EUR: fraction of the population speaking a western European language [HJ].
GADP: average from 1986 to 1995 of these five indices from Inter-Country Risk
Guide: a measure of the rule of law, a measure of the government’s commitment
to honor contracts with foreign firms, a measure of the government’s refraining
from expropriating foreign property, a measure of corruption, and a measure of
bureaucratic quality. These indices are measured on a [0, 1] scale with higher values
denoting better institutions [HJ].
GOV: the first principal component of a set of seven measures, the Gastil measure
of civil liberties from Freedom House, a measure of what percentage of the population
speak the official language, and five measures of institutions from Inter-Country
Risk Guide. These five measures are: the absence of corruption, bureaucratic quality,
government commitment not to modify contracts with foreign firms, adherence to
the rule of law, the lack of risk of government expropriation of property. These five
measures are given on a 0 to 10 scale with higher values denoting better characteristics.
These institutional measures are averaged over 1984 to 1995 [Englebert].
INDEP : natural log of number of years between independence and 1995 [Englebert].
INST: average of six measures, namely, voice and accountability, political stability,
government effectiveness, regulatory quality, rule of law and control of corruption.
For further details and links to the dataset go to http://www.worldbank.org/wbi
/governance/pubs/aggindicators.html [Kaufmann et al. 1999].
LAT: absolute value of latitude divided by 90, equator equals zero [HJ].
LEGIT: takes the value one if a state is considered legitimate and zero otherwise.
Historical Legacy and Institutions Across Countries 393A state is legitimate if it has never been colonized, if it had no human settlement
prior to colonization, if the settler population completely marginalized the indigenous
population, if there was a return to sovereignty after colonization in which political
authority devolved upon the same group that held it before colonization, if political
power after colonization arose from precolonial power sources, or if the state was
created by groups actively choosing to form their own political entity which did
not conflict with other large indigenous groups [Englebert].
LNDLOCK: equals one for a landlocked country and equals zero otherwise
[Englebert].
MORT : natural log of the settler mortality rate [Acemoglu et al. 2001].
POP: Natural log of the country’s population in 1978 [Englebert].
STANQ: measure of state antiquity (most common in their paper) on a zero to one
scale where higher values denote states with a longer history [Bockstette et al. 2002].
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Table A1. Data: countries classified as legitimate are in italics
INST ELF STANQ DEN CROP MORT
Former British colonies
Australia 1.620667 0.32 0.17 0.026008 0.045245 2.146
Bahamas 0.943333 NA NA 1.25 -0.3569 NA
Bangladesh -0.675 NA 0.61 23.69668 -0.02388 4.268
Barbados 0.936833 0.22 0.14 1.25 NA NA
Belize 0.245533 NA NA 1.538462 NA NA
Botswana 0.714333 0.51 0.3 0.142857 0.016402 NA
Canada 1.615333 0.75 0.23 0.02 0.015407 2.779
Dominica 0.2094 NA NA 1.25 NA NA
Egypt -0.31633 0.04 0.59 4 -0.0006 4.217
Fiji -0.1058 NA 0.48 1.530612 -0.03572 NA
Gambia -0.41467 0.73 0.2 4.230769 0.149365 7.293
Ghana -0.16933 0.71 0.24 4.230769 -0.03568 6.504
India -0.226 0.89 0.6 23.69668 0.201691 3.884
Iraq -2.02233 0.36 NA 2.272727 0.017325 NA
Israel 0.653667 0.2 0.51 10 0.057426 NA
Jamaica -0.007 0.05 0.21 1.25 -0.09193 4.868
Jordan 0.084333 0.05 0.51 2.222222 -0.01192 NA
Kenya -0.8 0.83 0.07 2.631579 0.069074 4.977
Kuwait 0.303667 0.18 NA NA -0.06879 NAHistorical Legacy and Institutions Across Countries 395
INST ELF STANQ DEN CROP MORT
Former British colonies
Lesotho -0.07433 0.22 0.09 0.224719 -0.02162 NA
Malawi -0.439 0.62 0.3 0.793651 0.262781 NA
Malaysia 0.395667 0.72 0.67 1.176471 -0.00595 2.874
Mauritius 0.687333 0.58 0.1 0 NA 3.418
Myanmar -1.543 0.47 NA 5.882353 -0.06118 3.544
Namibia 0.309667 NA NA 0.142857 0.003466 NA
New Zealand 1.77 0.37 0.12 0 0.035878 2.146
Nigeria -1.21167 0.87 0.42 4.230769 0.085161 7.603
Pakistan -0.892 0.64 0.64 23.69668 0.02052 3.611
Qatar 0.423 NA NA NA -0.14988 NA
Sierra Leone -1.195 0.77 NA 4.230769 -0.12194 6.18
Singapore 1.626 0.42 0.39 1.176471 NA 2.874
South Africa 0.272333 0.88 0.14 0.224719 0.042549 2.741
Sri Lanka -0.33333 0.47 0.65 15.15152 0.12582 4.246
St. Kitts 0.281733 NA NA 1.25 NA NA
St. Lucia 0.4167 NA NA 1.25 NA NA
St. Vincent 0.357167 NA NA 1.25 NA NA
Sudan -1.53333 0.73 NA 1.6 0.097921 4.48
Swaziland -0.43327 NA 0.08 0.224719 -0.04441 NA
Tanzania -0.51333 0.93 NA 1.966292 0.179257 4.977
Trin. & Tob. 0.406667 0.56 0.18 1.25 NA 4.443
U.S.A. 1.431667 0.5 0.2 0.085106 0.219865 2.708
Uganda -0.64067 0.9 0.12 7.142857 -0.01314 5.635
UAE 0.532333 NA NA NA -0.02913 NA
Zambia -0.47567 0.82 0.07 0.793651 0.22811 NA
Zimbabwe -1.01533 0.54 0.2 0.793651 0.108777 NA
Former French colonies
Algeria -1.046 0.43 0.5 0.641026 0.003223 4.359
Benin -0.08047 0.62 0.24 4.230769 0.303575 NA
Burkina Faso -0.39167 0.68 NA 4.230769 0.24742 5.635
Cameroon -0.88833 0.89 0.39 1.495327 -0.08393 5.635
C.A.R. -0.8518 0.69 0.18 1.495327 0.010014 5.635
Chad -0.86633 0.83 0.18 0.6 0.08891 5.635
Comoros -0.72507 NA NA 5 NA NA
Congo -1.23567 0.66 0.38 1.495327 -0.03069 5.481
Djibouti -0.71237 NA NA NA -0.03084 NA
Gabon -0.51233 0.69 0.37 1.495327 -0.07213 NA
Guinea -0.84167 0.75 0.26 4.230769 0.027163 6.18
Haiti -1.24233 0.01 0.22 1.25 -0.03449 4.868
Ivory Coast -0.76267 0.86 0.29 4.230769 -0.08992 6.504
Laos -0.881 0.6 NA 1.666667 -0.04145 NA
Madagascar -0.26067 0.06 0.21 1.186441 0.072985 6.284
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Table A1. (continued) Data: countries classified as legitimate are in italics
INST ELF STANQ DEN CROP MORT
Former French colonies
Mali -0.199 0.78 0.22 0.6 0.061717 7.986
Mauritania -0.35207 0.33 0.07 0.6 -0.00116 5.635
Morocco -0.09133 0.53 0.62 2.5 0.062317 4.359
Mozambique -0.493 0.65 0.26 1.282051 0.217769 NA
Niger -0.681 0.73 0.37 0.6 0.001662 5.991
Senegal -0.31433 0.72 0.34 4.230769 0.094161 5.104
Seychelles -0.21693 NA NA 0 NA NA
Syria -0.85133 0.22 0.51 6.578947 0.023738 NA
Thailand 0.115 0.66 0.75 3.921569 -0.0646 NA
Togo -0.83567 0.71 0.13 4.230769 -0.01839 6.504
Tunisia 0.126667 0.16 0.52 5 0.029277 4.143
Former Spanish colonies
Argentina -0.02967 0.31 0.22 0.107914 0.211762 4.263
Bolivia -0.28033 0.68 0.42 0.818182 -0.12775 4.263
Chile 1.106 0.14 0.25 0.789474 0.01488 4.263
Colombia -0.567 0.06 0.26 0.877193 -0.06133 4.263
Costa Rica 0.785 0.07 0.27 1.538462 -0.05881 4.358
Dom. Rep. -0.2 0.04 0.22 1.25 -0.03191 4.868
Ecuador -0.61167 0.53 0.42 2.142857 0.0384 4.263
El Salvador -0.073 0.17 0.27 1.538462 -0.00952 4.358
Grenada 0.352933 NA NA 1.25 NA NA
Guatemala -0.55433 0.64 0.39 1.538462 -0.1138 4.263
Guyana -0.076 0.58 0.16 0.212766 -0.07796 NA
Honduras -0.45633 0.16 0.24 1.538462 -0.03966 4.358
Mexico -0.06667 0.3 0.42 2.5 0.025503 4.263
Nicaragua -0.406 0.18 0.28 1.538462 -0.01344 5.096
Panama 0.145 0.28 0.26 1.538462 -0.09448 5.096
Paraguay -0.76033 0.14 0.25 0.487805 0.08284 4.358
Peru -0.29067 0.59 0.37 1.550388 0.011955 4.263
Philippines -0.172 0.74 0.18 1.666667 -0.08002 NA
Uruguay 0.637667 0.2 0.21 0 0.714393 4.263
Venezuela -0.71133 0.11 0.21 0.43956 -0.07459 4.358
Former Portuguese Colonies
Angola -1.48333 0.78 0.19 1.495327 0.046532 5.635
Brazil -0.01767 0.07 0.28 0.117509 -0.07213 4.263
Cape Verde 0.242467 NA 0.19 NA NA NA
Guinea-Biss. -0.889 NA NA 4.230769 0.06319 NA
Mozambique -0.493 0.65 0.26 1.282051 0.217769 NA
Former Belgian Colonies
Burundi -1.34593 0.04 0.11 25 -0.02004 NA
Rwanda -0.9902 0.14 0.22 25 -0.07201 5.635
Congo (Dem.) -1.964 0.9 NA 1.495327 -0.0469 5.481References
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Table A1. (continued) Data: countries classified as legitimate are in italics
INST ELF STANQ DEN CROP MORT
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